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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
This case does not present questions requiring review
on writ of certiorari.
OPINION OF UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported at
Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau. Inc. et al.. 185 Utah Adv.
Rptr. 16 (Utah C. App. 1992).

A copy of the opinion is attached

as Exhibit A.
GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT IS INVOKED
The Court of Appeals opinion was filed April 22, 1992.
Jurisdiction is asserted by the appellees pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 78-2-2 and Rules 45-51 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
CONTROLLING LAW
The controlling provision of law is Rule 50 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure regarding motions for judgment
notwithstanding the jury's verdict.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Mr. Turner filed a worker's compensation claim

which was adjusted by General Adjustment Bureau (GAB).

GAB

became suspicious about the validity of the claim and retained

the service of Inteldex to investigate it.

(Tr. 133, 215, 233-

234).
2.
outset.

Mrs. Turner was involved in the claim from the

She filled out the original claim form for her husband

(Tr. 305), and regularly communicated with the GAB adjusters
regarding the claim.
3.

(Tr. 235, 259, 291, 306).

Mrs. Turner admitted at trial that she had told GAB

things which were not true regarding her husband's condition.
(Tr. 291-292).
4.

Inteldex's investigation involved six occasions on

which the Turners were contacted.
handled by Ron Hyer of Inteldex.

All these contacts were
(Tr. 131). There were five

visits at the Turner home ranging in length from 17 minutes to 34
minutes.

There was also one telephone conference.

The total

time involved for all the contacts was 2 hours and 8 minutes.
(Trial Exhibits 2 and 3).
5.

Mr. Hyer did not introduce himself as a private

investigator.

His object was to obtain candid information.

He

used the cover of a door to door market testing representative.
He gave the Turners various free products.
was friendly and courteous.
uninvited.

(Tr. 166). Mr. Hyer

He never came into the home

(Tr. 161, 166, 265, 303).
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6.

Inteldex is an investigation company that provides

services to insurance companies and Federal and State agencies
for investigation of questionable compensation or liability
claims, as well as theft and embezzlement.

(Tr. 114, 101, 115,

119).
7.

Inteldex representatives appeared at Mr. Turner's

worker's compensation hearing and testified regarding what they
had seen.

Mrs. Turner specifically conceded that the Inteldex

testimony was honest and truthful.
8.

(Tr. 294, 304).

Mr. Turner was denied further benefits.

Subsequently, he and Mrs. Turner filed this action against
Inteldex and GAB.

Several claims were alleged which were

dismissed by the court prior to trial.

Those remaining for trial

were Mrs. Turner's claim of fraud, invasion of privacy, and
conspiracy.
9.

(Tr. 894, 896).
At trial, she claimed for a loss of $20 in

babysitting expenses and an indeterminate loss of wages, but the
evidence she presented was unconvincing and not accepted by the
jury.
10.
damages.

She also claimed generalized emotional distress

Her only support of such damage claim was her own

testimony and that of her husband.

She did not present any

professional psychiatric testimony although at the time of the
3

trial, she was undergoing psychiatric treatment for a number of
other problems she had which she stated were unrelated to
Inteldex and GAB.
11.

The jury found unanimously that plaintiff had

failed to prove either fraud or invasion of privacy.
ARGUMENT
APPELLEE'S PETITION ATTEMPTS TO ARTICULATE THREE
BASES FOR CERTIORARI. NONE OF THE ISSUES SUGGESTED
MERIT SUCH CONSIDERATION.
POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION IS CONSISTENT
WITH ESTABLISHED CASE LAW.
In inflammatory language, appellee suggests that the
ruling of the Court of Appeals somehow runs counter to Anglo
Saxon Tradition.

However, she fails to specify any such

conflict.
Plaintiff's Complaint sought relief under the theories
of invasion of privacy and fraud.

It is apparently plaintiff's

argument that any time an individual enters a home without
revealing their purpose, it is an invasion of privacy per

se.

This argument is inconsistent with the law of invasion of
privacy.
The court's instruction to the jury regarding invasion
of privacy was based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
4

Section 652B and Comment D.

Appellee took no exception to it.

The instruction read as follows:
In this case, the plaintiff Jackie Turner
claims that the defendants have invaded her
privacy. In order to find that defendants
have invaded the plaintiff's privacy, you
must find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that:
1.

The defendants intentionally intruded
upon the solitude or seclusion of the
plaintiff or her private affairs or
concerns; aitd

2.

That the intrusion was substantial and
would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.

Any intrusion must be judged on its own facts.

The

issues of reasonableness and degree of offensiveness are issues
of fact within the special province of the jury.
Montova. 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983).

Cruz v.

By her motion for JNOV and

this petition for writ of certiorari, appellee seeks to bypass
the jury's wisdom and establish a per se rule.
Most of the cases cited by appellee involve either
trespass claims criminal and fourth amendment search and seizure
issues which are inapplicable.

None of the cases that she cites

which involve civil invasion of privacy claims offer any support
for a per se rule.
For example, in the case of Miller v. NBC, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 668 (1987), a television news crew barged into plaintiff's
5

home and filmed her husband as he was dying of a heart attack in
his bedroom.

Neither plaintiff nor her husband had given the

news crew any permission to come in.

Graphic scenes were taken

of his distress which were broadcast nationally.

The California

Appellate Court reversed a summary judgment of dismissal of
plaintiff's claim for invasion of privacy.

It determined the

conduct of entering the home without invitation and subsequent
broadcast could be considered by a jury to be "highly offensive
to a reasonable person."

It reversed summary judgment so that a

jury could decide.
The Miller court did not determine as a matter of law
that the right of privacy had been violated per se.
determined that there was a jury issue.

It simply

The invasion in that

case was clearly far more severe than the invasion in the instant
case.

Nevertheless, even in that circumstance, the court did not

grant judgment in favor of plaintiff as a matter of law as is
requested here.
The case of Hester v. Barnett. 723 S.W.2d 544 (Missouri
App. 1987) also cited by plaintiff involves the same result.

The

Hester case involved a situation in which the plaintiffs had
engaged in private confidential discussions with their minister
regarding family problems.

The minister publicly revealed what

they had told him in confidence and branded them as child
6

abusers.

Plaintiffs sued the minister for invasion of privacy.

The Missouri Appellate Court reversed a summary judgment of
dismissal and remanded the case for jury determination.
As with the Miller case, the Hester case involves
conduct dramatically more egregious than that in the instant
case.

Nevertheless, the court required a jury to determine

whether the conduct violated the right of privacy, it did not
substitute its own opinion.
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case is
consistent with a long legal tradition.

Issues of reasonableness

and offensiveness are issues uniquely suited to jury
determination.

In this case, the jury found that appellee had

failed to carry her burden of proof.
by competent evidence.
disturbed.

The verdict was supported

The verdict should not have been

The Court of Appeals correctly reinstated it.
POINT II

APPELLEE'S ATTEMPT TO EXPAND THE LAW OF FRAUD
DOES NOT MERIT CERTIORARI.
In addition to her invasion of privacy claim at trial,
plaintiff also attempted to prove fraud.

However her efforts to

demonstrate any pecuniary loss were not persuasive and were
rejected by the jury.

The Court of Appeals correctly found that

there was competent evidence to support that finding.
7

Appellee

argues that she should be able to recover "emotional distress"
damages under her fraud claim even in the absence of any
pecuniary damage.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals were
consistent in rejecting this expansion of the law of fraud.
While appellee was able to point to certain cases from other
jurisdictions which allowed emotional distress damages in fraud
cases under particular facts or circumstances, the bulk of case
law and the commentators are consistent in restricting fraud to
claims of pecuniary harm.
§ 9.2 at 602 (1973).

Dobbs Handbook on Legal Remedies,

This position is also consistent with

Section 525 and 549 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
This rule is further consistent with Section 46 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts which provides for a separate tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress and defines the
elements of that tort.
1982).

Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah

Plaintiff's attempt to utilize the elements of fraud to
i

support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
and thus circumvent the requirements of Section 46 of the
Restatement is inappropriate and contradictory.

Both lower

courts properly rejected it.

i
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POINT III
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW APPLIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
CONSISTENT WITH LONGSTANDING UTAH LAW.
In a final attempt to create some justification for
certiorari, appellee claims that the Court of Appeals erred in
determining the standard of review to be applied in this case.
Appellee's position is simply wrong.
Recent cases from this court defining the standard to
be applied in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a JNOV motion
define it as follows:
A trial court should grant a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict if,
after reviewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-movant, it finds
that no competent evidence supports the
verdict. In reviewing the trial court's
determination on such an issue, this court
must apply the same standard.
King v. Fereday. 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987) at p. 620.
The granting of a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict is only justified
if, after looking at the evidence and all its
reasonable inferences in a light most
favorable to the party moved against, the
trial court concludes that there is no
competent evidence which would support a
verdict in his favor. On review, this court
looks at the evidence in the same manner.
Gustaveson v. Greg, 655 P.2d 693 (Utah 1982) at p. 695.
In other words, the trial court can enter the
judgment notwithstanding the verdict only for
9

one reason—the absence of any substantial
evidence to support the verdict.
Koer v. Mavfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) at p. 568.
In fact, the very case upon which appellee relies to
claim some conflict in standards further supports the rule.
The court's standard of review of a directed
verdict is the same as that imposed upon the
trial court. We must examine the evidence in
the light most favorable to the losing party,
and if there is a reasonable basis in the
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn
therefrom that would support a judgment in
favor of the losing party, the directed
verdict cannot be sustained.
Management Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v.
Graystone Pines, Inc.. 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982) at p. 898.
The standard of review utilized by the Court of Appeals in this
case could not have stronger support.
CONCLUSION
Appellee's purported grounds in their Petition for Writ
of Certiorari are meritless and without basis.

The writ should

be denied.
DATED this

day of v/.^ **yy-

, 1992.

RICHARDS/BRAtfDT, MILfcER & NELSON

STEVE!
for Appellants
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<

CERTIFICATE OF 8ERVICB
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing instrument were mailed, first-class, postage
prepaid, on this Z^-A day of C/c(^
, 1992, to the
following:
'
/
Glen A. Cook
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attornesy for Appellees
4252 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Craig L. Barlow
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARINTEAU
Attorneys for Appellant GAB
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

11

E x h i b i t "A"

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00
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Clerk of the Court
Utah Court ol Appeals

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,
Case No. 910587-CA
v.
General Adjustment Bureau,
Inc.; Oak Norton; and Inteldex
Corporation, d/b/a Inteltech
Services,

F I L E D
( A p r i l 2 2 , 1992)

Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Attorneys:

Craig L. Barlow, Salt Lake City, for General
Adjustment Bureau
Robert L. Stevens and Michael L. Schwab, Salt Lake
City, for Oak Norton and Inteldex
Gordon K. Jensen, West Valley City, and Glen A. Cook,
Salt Lake City, for Jackie Turner

Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Russon.
GARFF, Judge:
Defendants, General Adjustment Bureau (GAB), Inteldex
Corporation, d/b/a Inteltech (Inteltech), and Oak Norton (Norton)
appeal the trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(j.n.o.v.) in favor of plaintiff, Jackie Turner (Turner), and the
punitive damages award. Turner cross appeals, asserting that the
trial court erred (1) by refusing to instruct the jury that
emotional distress damages are recoverable in a cause of action
for fraud, (2) by admitting evidence concerning Turner's past
drug use and psychological history, and (3) by refusing, after
granting j.n.o.v., to submit the issue of damages to the jury.
We reverse.

FACTS
On November 30, 1984, Turner's husband filed a workers'
compensation claim asserting that he was injured in a workrelated accident. His employer's workers' compensation insurance
carrier, Occidental Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, retained
GAB to adjust the claim. GAB, in turn, hired Inteltech to
investigate the claim.
Inteltech employees, masquerading as representatives of a
product marketing research company, conducted an undercover
investigation of the claim over a period of approximately three
months. Utilizing the marketing company facade, they gained
access to the Turner home to gather information about the
activities of Turner's husband. Inteltech employees visited the
Turners at their home and asked them to test various consumer
products on a continuing basis. In addition to testing products,
an Inteltech employee invited Turner to participate in a shopping
spree. However, on the day the shopping spree was scheduled to
occur, Inteltech cancelled it. Turner claims that as a result of
the invitation, she lost approximately twenty dollars because she
had hired and paid a babysitter.
Turner further claims that as a result of her unwitting
participation in the undercover investigation, she lost time she
could have spent working. Turner's work consisted of tasks
performed for her landlord on a by-the-job basis, for which she
received rent credits.
On July 20, 1987, at a hearing on the workers' compensation
claim of Turner's husband, Inteltech employees appeared and
testified about information gathered through the undercover
investigation. It was then that Turner first became aware that
Inteltech employees had represented themselves as market
researchers for the purpose of investigating her husband's claim.
After the hearing, the administrative law judge denied the
workers' compensation claim.
Turner sued, claiming fraud, invasion of privacy, and
conspiracy. She sought special, general, and punitive damages.
The case was tried to a jury on March 12 through 14, 1990.
At the close of Turner's case, defendants moved for a
directed verdict, whicji the court denied* Turner, in turn, moved
for a directed verdict at the close of defendants' cases, which
the court took under advisement. The issues of fraud, invasion
of privacy, conspiracy, and Norton's personal liability were
submitted to the jury. The jury rendered a verdict against
Turner on both the fraud and invasion of privacy claims, and
therefore, did not reach the conspiracy claim and damages issues.

910587-CA

2

Thereafter,- Turner moved for j.n.o.v. and for a new trial on all
issues submitted to the jury.
After oral argument, the trial court granted j.n.o.v. and
denied the motion for a new trial. The court ruled that "no
reasonable minds could have differed on the evidence which was
presented to [the jury] . . . . And it was highly offensive to
this Court for the defendants to do what they did to [Turner].11
As to the claim of fraud, the court found that Turner proved
damages in the amount of twenty dollars for the babysitter. The
court, however, found that Turner's evidence concerning damages
for lost work time was "too speculative."
The court entered judgment, jointly and severally, against
GAB and Inteltech on the fraud, invasion of privacy, and
conspiracy claims in the following amounts: $20.00 for out-ofpocket damages; $5,000.00 for general damages; $3,000.00 for
punitive damages; post-judgment interest; and attorney fees. The
trial court further found Norton to be personally liable for the
entire amount of the judgment. Turner moved to amend the
judgment to allow the damages issues to go to the jury. The
court denied the motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A j.n.o.v. can be granted only when the losing party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hansen v. Stewart, 761
P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). In other words, j.n.o.v. "is only
justified if, after looking at the evidence and all of its
reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the party
moved against, the trial court concludes that there is no
competent evidence which would support a verdict in his favor."
Gustaveson v. Gregg, 655 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1982); King v.
Feredav. 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987). On appeal, we apply the
same standard. Gustaveson. 655 P.2d at 695; King. 739 P.2d at
620. In determining whether competent evidence supports the
verdict, we accept as true all testimony and reasonable
inferences flowing therefrom that tend to prove defendants' case,
and we disregard all conflicts and evidence that tend to disprove
defendants' case. Koer v. Mavfair Mkts.. 19 Utah 2d 339, 431
P.2d 566, 568-69 (1967).
FRAUD
Defendants contend that the trial court erred in granting
j.n.o.v. because competent evidence supported the jury's verdict
of no fraud in that Turner was not damaged as a result of the
undercover investigation.

910587-CA
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To establish fraud, a party must prove by clear and
convincing .evidence each of the following elements: (1) a
representation was made; (2) concerning a presently existing
material factr (3) which was false; (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that
there was insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party
to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8)
and was thereby induced to act; (9) to that party's injury and
damage.1 Mikkelson v. Quail Vallev Realty. 641 P.2d 124, 126
(Utah 1982); Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 P.2d 273,
274-75 (1952).
The trial court in the instant case applied the wrong
standard in granting j.n.o.v. Instead of determining whether
competent evidence supported the verdict, see, e.g.. King v.
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1987), the court found that no
reasonable minds could have differed on the evidence presented.
Viewing the evidence in favor of defendants, we conclude
that substantial competent evidence supported the jury's verdict
of no cause of action for fraud. Turner's evidence that she
sustained damage when she hired and paid a babysitter apparently
was not, as viewed by the jury, clear and convincing. At trial,
when asked how much she paid the babysitter, Turner vaguely and
equivocally testified, "I think it was like twenty bucks or

1. GAB contends that Turner must prove substantial damage to
recover under her claim of fraud. In support, GAB cites to
Dilworth v. Lauritzen. 18 Utah 2d 386, 424 P.2d 136, 138 (1967),
where the Utah Supreme Court, after stating that "one of the
essential elements of fraud is that the plaintiff sustain
damages," cites to Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247
P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952), and section 105 of the third edition of
Prosser on Torts (currently located at section 110 of the fifth
edition of Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts). Although
section 110 of Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts supports
the proposition that substantial damage is required before a
fraud or deceit cause of action can arise, see W. Page Keeton et
aJL. , Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 110, at 765 & n.l
(5th ed. 1984), GAB reads Dilworth too broadly. Utah law
requires that a party sustain only some injury or damage. See
Mikkelson v. Quail Vallev Realty. 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982);
Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980); Taylor v. Gasor,
Inc., 607 P.2d 293, 294 (Utah 1980); Rummell v. Bailey. 7 Utah 2d
137, 320 P.2d 653, 659 (1958); Pace. 247 P.2d at 274-75.
Moreover, this court has interpreted Pace to require that a
complaining party need only "establish some damage." Conder v.
910587-CA
A.L.
Williams & Assocs.. 739 P.2d4 634, 640 (Utah App. 1987).
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something like that . . . .
It was reasonable." Furthermore,
Turner did not identify the babysitter nor did she produce
evidence of payment as claimed.
Finally, competent evidence supported the jury's implied
finding that Turner did not sustain any lost work time damages.
Consistent with the jury's finding, the court found this claim to
be "too speculative" inasmuch as it was based solely on Turner's
unsubstantiated assertions of lost work time. Because the jury
had competent evidence to support its verdict that no fraud
occurred,2 the trial court erred in granting j.n.o.v. on the
claim of fraud.3
INVASION OF PRIVACY
Defendants claim that competent evidence supported the
jury's verdict that there was no invasion of Turner's privacy.
Invasion of privacy as a common law tort has developed into four

2. The failure to prove any of the previously mentioned elements
of fraud is fatal to a complaining party's case. Inasmuch as
competent evidence supports the jury's implied finding of no
damage, we need not address arguments concerning other elements
of fraud.
3. Assuming, arguendo, Turner could prove some sort of damage
under her fraud claim, as a complaining party, she still had a
duty to mitigate damages. Conder, 739 P.2d at 639. A
complaining party is not entitled to recover damages resulting
from wrongful conduct which could have been avoided or minimized
by reasonable means. Anaelos v. First Interstate Bank of Utah,
671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983); Conder. 739 P.2d at 639.
Defendants' evidence demonstrates that Turner failed to
mitigate the damages she claims to have sustained by having to
hire and pay a babysitter. Turner testified that an Inteltech
investigator called and cancelled the shopping spree the day it
was scheduled. Other than the bald statement that the babysitter
still had to be paid, Turner gave no explanation why she could
not cancel the babysitter or otherwise minimize her damages.

910587-CA
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distinct torts/ However, Turner's cause of action is based only
on the tort of-.intrusion upon seclusion.
To establish an invasion of privacy claim of intrusion upon
seclusion,5 a complaining party must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence an intentional substantial intrusion, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of the complaining
party that would be highly offensive to the reasonable person.6
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B & cmt. d (1977); accord W.
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts.
§ 117, at 855 (5th ed. 1984). The language "highly offensive to
the reasonable person" suggests a determination of fact for which
a jury is uniquely qualified. See Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723,

4. In the classic article entitled Privacy. Prosser enumerated
the four torts under the right to privacy as follows:
1.
Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or
solitude, or into his private affairs;
2.
Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
about the plaintiff;
3.
Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye; and
4.
Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of
the plaintiff's name or likeness.
William L. Prosser, Privacy. 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383, 389 (1960); Cox
v. Hatch. 761 P.2d 556, 563 n.7 (Utah 1988).
5. There is little case law to assist us in the determination we
make today concerning Turner's invasion of privacy claim. The
most probable reason for this is because
even today most individuals not acting in some
clearly identified official capacity do not go
into private homes without the consent of those
living there; not only do widely held notions of
decency preclude it, but most individuals
understand that to do so is either a tort, a
crime, or both.
Miller v. National Broadcasting Co.. 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 678-79
(Ct. App. 1986) (footnotes omitted).
6. Once a party establishes a cause of action for invasion of
privacy, that party recovers for mental distress damages proved,
if such damages are the kind that normally result from such an
invasion. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H(b) (1977); see
also Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co.. 291 P.2d 194,
198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) ("the fact that damages resulting from
an invasion of the right of privacy cannot be measured by a
pecuniary standard is not a bar to recovery").
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729 (Utah 1983). In determining issues of fact,7 a jury
necessarily accepts the testimony of certain witnesses and
discounts conflicting testimony. Fillmore Prods, v. Western
States Paving, 592 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1979). On appeal, we will
not substitute our judgment for that of the jury unless no
competent evidence supports the verdict. Id.
After viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences
flowing therefrom in a light most favorable to defendants, see
Koer v. Mavfair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566, 568-69
(1967), we conclude that competent evidence supported the jury's
verdict of no invasion of privacy. The record discloses first,
that the purpose and scope of the undercover investigation was
limited to gathering information concerning the workers'
compensation claim.8 Second, at no time did Inteltech
representatives enter Turner's home without her permission.
Third, the investigation visits were relatively short. Fourth,
Turner's credibility was called into question by competent
evidence. Based on the foregoing, the jury could reasonably
conclude, as it apparently did, that Inteltech employees did not
substantially intrude in a manner that would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person. Therefore, the trial court erred by
granting j.n.o.v. on the invasion of privacy claim.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES FOR FRAUD
Turner cross appeals, claiming that the trial court erred by
refusing to instruct the jury that emotional distress damages may
be recovered in a fraud action. A challenge to a trial court's
refusal to give a jury instruction presents questions of law.
Ramon By and Through Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah
1989). Consequently, we do not defer to the trial court's
rulings. Id. We affirm such a refusal when the proposed
instruction does not properly and fairly state the law as applied
to the facts of the case. Xc|. at 133-34.
Whether emotional distress damages are recoverable for fraud
is a question of first impression under Utah law. Authorities
are split on this issue. Illustrative of decisions not allowing
recovery of emotional distress damages in a fraud action are
7. The jury has broad prerogatives in determining issues of
fact. Evans v. Stuart. 17 Utah 2d 308, 410 P.2d 999, 1002
(1966).
8. There is no evidence in the record and no claims were made at
trial that Inteltech employees harassed or annoyed Turner in the
course of the undercover investigation.
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Cornell v. Wunschel, 408 N.W.2d 369, 382 (Iowa 1987); Carrigg v.
Blue. 323 S.E.-2d 787, 789 n.l (S.C. Ct. App. 1984); Umphrev v.
Sprinkel. 682 P.2d 1247, 1258-59 (Idaho 1983); Ellis v. Crockett.
451 P.2d 814, 820 (Haw. 1969); and Harsche v. Czvz. 61 N.W.2d
265, 272 (Neb. 1953). In contrast, Kilduff v. Adams. Inc., 593
A.2d 478, 484 (Conn. 1991); Trimble v. Citv of Denver, 697 P.2d
716, 730 (Colo. 1985); Crowley v. Global Realty. Inc., 474 A.2d
1056, 1058 (N.H. 1984); McRae v. Bolstad. 646 P.2d 771, 775-76
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982), aff'd. 676 P.2d 496 (Wash. 1984); and
Rosener v. Sears. Roebuck & Co.. 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 246 (1980),
appeal dismissed. 450 U.S. 1051, 101 S. Ct. 1772 (1981)
illustrate decisions allowing such recovery.
As indicated above, many jurisdictions follow the rule that
emotional distress damages are not recoverable in a cause of
action for fraud. £f. First Sec. Bank of Utah v. J.B.J.
Feedvards, Inc.. 653 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982) (emotional
distress damages "are an extreme remedy, which should be
dispensed with caution"). This rule stems from the principle
that fraud, as an economic tort, protects only pecuniary losses.
Walsh v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 656 F.2d 367, 370 (8th Cir. 1981).
According to a leading treatise on remedies:
[DJeceit is an economic, not a dignitary
tort, and resembles, in the interests it
seeks to protect, a contract claim more than
a tort claim. For this reason, though strong
men may cry at the loss of money, separate
recovery for mental anguish is usually denied
in deceit cases, just as it is denied in
contract cases, simply because emotional
distress, though resulting naturally enough
from many frauds, is not one of the interests
the law ordinarily seeks to protect in deceit
cases.
D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies. § 9.2 at 602 (1973)
(footnotes omitted); see also Pihakis v. Cottrell. 243 So.2d 685,
692 (Ala. 1971) ("plaintiff must show . . . actual pecuniary loss
as the result of the fraud"); Jurcich v. General Motors Corp.,
539 S.W.2d 595, 600-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) ("deceit belongs to
that class of tort of which pecuniary loss constitutes a part of
the cause of action").
Under section 525 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "One
who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, . . . is
subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss."
(Emphasis added.) Furthermore, in addressing the measure of
damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, section 549 of the
Restatement states, "The recipient of a fraudulent
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misrepresentation is entitled to recover . . . the pecuniary loss
. . . of which the misrepresentation is a legal cause, including"
the difference between the value of what was received in the
transaction and its purchase price and "pecuniary loss suffered
otherwise as a consequence of . . . the misrepresentation."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549(1)(a) and (b) (1977)
(emphasis added). While the Restatement does not specifically
exclude emotional distress damages in a cause of action for
fraud, the repeated references to "pecuniary loss" implicitly
excludes such recovery. R. Dunn, Recovery of Damages for Fraud
156 (1988).
Inasmuch as fraud is an economic tort directed towards
redressing pecuniary losses, Cornell, 408 N.W.2d at 382; Walsh,
656 F.2d at 370, we conclude that the better reasoned approach is
to disallow recovery of emotional distress damages in a fraud
action. As a result, the trial court correctly refused to
instruct the jury accordingly.
EVIDENCE OF PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY AND PAST DRUG USE
On cross appeal, Turner claims that the trial court erred by
admitting evidence concerning her psychiatric history and past
drug use. Whether evidence is admissible is a question of law
reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991).9
Turner contends that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of her psychiatric history and past drug use because the
evidence was irrelevant. Evidence is relevant if it has "any
9. Decisions prior to Ramirez created some confusion as to the
proper standard for reviewing a court's determination on
admissibility of evidence. See, e.g.. Whitehead v. American
Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990) ("[i]n
reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at trial,
deference is given to the trial court's advantageous position;
thus, that court's rulings regarding admissibility will not be
overturned *unless it clearly appears that the lower court was in
error.'") (quoting State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah
1986)); State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) (M[i]t
is well settled that trial court rulings on the admissibility of
evidence are not to be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse
of discretion"); Gray. 717 P.2d at 1316 (,f[t]his Court will not
disturb the ruling of the trial court on questions of
admissibility of evidence unless it clearly appears that the
lower court was in error"). In Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3, the
Utah Supreme Court acknowledged this confusion.
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tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401.
Quite clearly, the evidence pertaining to Turner's psychiatric
history and past drug use was relevant to the determination of
whether her claimed emotional distress damages under her invasion
of privacy claim were the result of a preexisting condition or
were caused by defendants' conduct.
Turner contends that even if the evidence relating to her
psychiatric history and past drug use were relevant, the court
erred in admitting it because the prejudicial effect of the
evidence outweighed its probative value. Under Utah Rule of
Evidence 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if "its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." The trial court's determination that evidence is
admissible under Rule 403 is reviewed for correctness, "[b]ut in
deciding whether the trial court erred as a matter of law, we de
facto grant it some discretion, because we reverse only if we
conclude that it acted unreasonably in striking the balance."
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3. In Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile
Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
McFarland v. Skaaas Cos., 678 P.2d 298, 304 (Utah 1984), the Utah
Supreme Court defined evidence that is "unfairly prejudicial" as
evidence having
a tendency to influence the outcome of the
trial by improper means, or if it appeals to
the jury's sympathies, or arouses its sense
of horror, provokes its instinct to punish or
otherwise causes a jury to base its decision
on something other than the established
propositions of the case.
Id. at 323 n.31.
The evidence involving Turner's psychiatric history and past
drug use was probative of whether her claimed emotional distress
damages were the result of a preexisting condition or were caused
by defendants' conduct. Having reviewed the trial court's
determination that the danger of unfair prejudice did not
substantially outweigh the evidence's probative value, we
conclude, in light of the discretion given to a trial court in
performing a Rule 4 03 balancing, that the court correctly
admitted the evidence.
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Finally, pursuant to the tort law doctrine commonly referred
to as the "thin-skull" or "eggshell skull" rule,10 Turner argues
that because defendants are required to take her as they find
her, the court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of her
psychiatric history and past drug use. This argument fails
because, "even though it is true that one who injures another
takes him as he is, nevertheless the plaintiff may not recover
damages for any pre-existing condition or disability she may have
had which did not result from any fault of the defendant."
Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 412 P.2d 451, 453 (1966)
(footnote omitted).
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the trial
court (1) erred in granting j.n.o.v., (2) correctly refused to
instruct the jury that emotional distress damages are recoverable
in a cause of action for fraud, and (3) correctly admitted
evidence concerning Turner's psychiatric history and past drug
use. Other arguments raised by the parties need not be
considpr6cT fft view of our d^jision herein. Therefore, we reverse
the JfudqmentJof
theytria^p^urt, and remand for judgment
consistent jfith
th^jujr^s verdict. No costs are awarded.

•Regnal W. Garff, Judg

WE COJIP^R:
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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

10. See W. Page Keeton et al.. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts. § 43, at 292 (5th ed. 1984).
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